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Abstract
Reliable broadcast is a powerful primitive guaranteeing that,
intuitively, all processes in a distributed system deliver the
same set of messages. ere is a twofold reason why this
primitive is appealing: (i) we can implement it deterministically
in a completely asynchronous environment, unlike stronger
primitives like consensus and total-order broadcast, and yet
(ii) it is powerful enough to implement numerous useful
applications like payment systems.
e problem we tackle in this paper is that of dynamic
reliable broadcast, i.e., enabling processes to join or leave the
system. is is desirable property for long-lived applications
supposed to be highly available, yet has been precluded in
previous asynchronous reliable broadcast protocols.
We introduce the first specification of a dynamic Byzantine
reliable broadcast (dbrb) primitive that is amenable to an asyn-
chronous implementation. Indeed, we present an algorithm that
implements this specification in an asynchronous environment.
Our algorithm ensures that if any correct process in the system
broadcasts (resp. delivers) a message, then every correct process
in the system delivers that message, or leaves the system. We
assume that, at any point in time, 2/3 of the processes in the
system are correct, which is tight. We also prove that even if
only one process in the system can fail—and it can fail bymerely
crashing—then it is impossible to implement a stronger primitive,
ensuring that if any correct process in the system broadcasts
(resp. delivers) a message, then every correct process in the sys-
tem delivers that message, including those that eventually leave.
1 Introduction
Networks typically offer a reliable form of communication
channels: TCP. As an abstraction, these channels ensure that
if neither the sender nor the receiver of a message fail, then
the message is eventually delivered. Essentially, the very fact
that certain messages might be lost when sent through the
underlying IP layer is hidden through re-transmission schemes
to the user of the TCP abstraction.
Yet, for many applications, TCP is not reliable enough.
Indeed, think of the situation where a message needs to be
∗isworkhas been supported inpart by agrant from Interchain Foundation.
sent to all processes of a distributed system. If the sender does
not fail, TCP will do the job; but otherwise, the message might
reach only a strict subset of processes. is can be problematic
in certain applications, such as a financial notification service
when processes subscribe to information published by other
processes. For fairness reasons, one might want to ensure that
if the sender fails, either all or no process receives the message.
We talk about reliable broadcast. Such a primitive does not
ensure that messages are delivered in the same total order, but
simply in an “all-or-nothing” manner.
It turns out that reliable broadcast is very appealing. It can be
used to implement many applications, including, for example,
a crypto-currency [12]. Indeed, unlike what was implicitly
considered since Nakamoto’s original paper [21], there is no
need to ensure consensus on the ordering of messages, i.e.,
to totally order messages, if the goal is to perform secure
payments. A reliable broadcast scheme suffices.
Reliable broadcast is also appealing because, unlike stronger
primitives like total order broadcast and consensus, it has been
shown to be implementable deterministically in a completely
asynchronous environment [4]. e basic idea is to assume a
quorum of correct processes, andmake that quorum responsible
of ensuring that a message is transmied to all processes if
the original sender of the message fails. In the case where the
message did not reach the quorum, it is not delivered by any
process. It is important to notice at this point a terminology dif-
ference between the act of ”receiving” and the act of ”delivering”
a message. A process indeed might ”receive” a message, but
might not ”deliver” it to its application until it is confident that
the ”all-or-nothing” property of reliable broadcast is ensured.
A closer look at all asynchronous implementations reveals,
however, a gap between theory and practice. e asynchronous
implementations of reliable broadcast that have been described
so far all assume a static system. Essentially, the set of processes
in the system remains the same, except that some of them
might fail. e ability of new process to join the system or
processes to explicitly ask to leave the system, which is very
desirable in a long-lived application supposed to be highly
available, is precluded in all asynchronous reliable broadcast
protocols published so far.
Some very interesting approaches have been proposed to
emulate a shared memory abstraction in an asynchronous and
dynamic message passing environment (i.e., without consensus).1
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ese include [1], [17], [10] and [2]. Our work is highly inspired
by [2] which algorithmic and theoretical approach we adapt
to an arbitrary failure model. However, [2] (and [1, 17, 10])
considered a crash-stop failure model. In contrast, (a) we tackle
the problem of a dynamic broadcasting system, instead of
shared memory emulation, and (b) consider an arbitrary failure
model (Byzantine failures), instead of crash failures.
We introduce the first specification of a dynamic Byzantine
reliable broadcast (dbrb) primitive that is amenable to an
asynchronous implementation. Namely, any process that is
outside the broadcast system can ask to join it, and will join,
if the process is correct; any process that is inside the broadcast
system can ask to leave it, and will eventually leave. Processes
inside the system can broadcast and deliver messages, whereas
processes outside the system cannot. Our specification is
intended for an asynchronous system for it does not require
agreement onwhich processes are in the system. In otherwords,
our specification does not build on top of a group membership
scheme, as does the classical view synchronous abstraction [7].
We present an algorithm that implements a dynamic Byzan-
tine reliable broadcast (dbrb) primitive in an asynchronous
environment, ensuring that if a correct process in the system
broadcast (resp. delivers) a message, then eventually every
correct process either delivers that message or leaves the system.
Our implementation is optimal according to two dimensions.
First, we assume that, at any point in time, 2/3 of the processes
inside the broadcast system are correct, which is tight. Second,
we show that the “all-or-nothing” property we ensure is, in
some sense, maximal. More specifically, we prove that in an
asynchronous system, even if only one process in the system
can fail, and it can merely fail by crashing, then it is impossible
to implement a stronger property, ensuring that if any correct
process in the system broadcasts (resp. delivers) a message,
then every correct process in the system delivers that message,
including those that eventually leave.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. We first describe
the system model we consider and give a specification of dbrb
(§2). en we provide high level insights about our algorithm
implementing dbrb (§3). We then discuss the full dbrb algo-
rithm (§4), prove its correctness (§5) and optimality (§6). Finally,
we conclude this paper by discussing related work (§7).
2 Model and Specification
We now describe the system model we consider (§2.1) and
specify our dbrb primitive (§§ 2.2 to 2.4).
2.1 A Universe of Asynchronous Processes
Weconsider a universeU of processes, someofwhich are subject
to arbitrary, i.e., Byzantine, failures. Processes that respect the al-
gorithm are correct. We assume correct processes communicate
through authenticated links: prior to sending a messagem to a
correct process q, a correct processp signsm, labeled 〈m〉σp , and
q eventually delivers this message and can verify its authenticity.
To simplify our presentation, we assume that the recipient pro-
cess q knows the sender process p, i.e., the identity of sender p is
implicit in messagem; moreover, we omit the signed notation,
and simply writem to mean a message signed by its sender p.
Processes are asynchronous: we make no assumptions on
communication delays or process relative speeds. We assume,
however, a global notion of time, outside the control of the
processes, which we use to describe the events that occur to
an external observer and prove the correctness of the protocol.
We consider a subset of U called the broadcast system. e
composition of this set changes over time and we denote it
by S(t), at time t. Processes in S(t) can broadcast and deliver
messages in a reliable manner, according to properties we will
describe below. We say that a process is a participant in the
broadcast system, or simply participant, at time t, if it is part of
S(t). If p /∈S(t), we say that p is not a participant in the broadcast
system at time t. We shall explain that in more details below.
2.2 Interface
e interface of our Dynamic Byzantine Reliable Broadcast
(dbrb) consists of four primitives:
1. broadcast(m): allows a participant process s to
disseminate messagemwithin the broadcast system.
2. deliver(m): this callback triggers at participant p to
handle the delivery of messagem.
3. join(): a process p invokes this operation to become a
participant in the broadcast system. When this invocation
returns, we say p joined the systemand thismeans p∈S(t).
Between the time p has invoked join() and has returned
from the invocation, we say that p’s join is pending.
4. leave(): a participant process p invokes this operation to
leave the broadcast system. When process p returns from
this invocation, we say that p left the system and p /∈S(t).
Between the time p invokes leave() and returns from that
invocation, we say that p’s leave is pending.
2.3 Assumptions
e following rules govern the behavior of correct processes.
(i) A correct process s can invoke a broadcast(m) operation
at time t only if s∈ S(t). (ii) A correct process p can trigger
a deliver(m) operation at time t only if p∈S(t). (iii) A correct
process p can invoke a join() operation at time t only if
p /∈S(t). Moreover, we assume p invokes join() at most once.
(iv) Finally, a correct process p can invoke a leave() operation
at time t if p∈S(t). Moreover, we assume p invokes leave()
at most once. We also make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Fault threshold). Let F(t) be the set of faulty
participant processes at time t and L(t) be the set of pending
leaves at t. At any time t, fewer than |S(t)3 | processes out of S(t)
can be in F(t)∪L(t).2
Assumption 2 (Finite number of reconfiguration requests).
e number of processes that want to join or leave the system (in
any execution) is finite. 1
Assumption 3. For presentation uniformity, we assume that
initially, at time 0, the set S is not empty and the processes in S(0)
have invoked and returned from a join() operation. Moreover,
every process in the universe U knows S(0).
2.4 Properties
We now define the guarantees of our dbrb abstraction
(definitions 1 and 2). For simplicity of presentation, we assume a
specific instance of dbrb, i.e., with a predefined sender process
s and one broadcast message.
Definition 1 (Basic guarantees). • Validity. If a correct
participant s broadcasts a messagem, then every correct par-
ticipant q eventually deliversm or process q leaves the system.
• Totality. If a correct participant p delivers a message m,
then every correct participant q eventually delivers m or
process q leaves the system.
• No duplication. No correct participant delivers more than
one message.
• Integrity. If some correct participant delivers a messagem
with sender s and s is correct, then s previously broadcastm.2
• Consistency. If some correct participant delivers a message
m and another correct participant delivers a message m′,
thenm=m′.
• Join Safety. If a correct process p is a participant in the
system at time t, then p has invoked a join() operation or
p was a participant in the system at time t′=0.
• Leave Safety. If a correct process p is not a participant in
the system at time t and p was a participant in the system
at time t′<t, then p has invoked a leave() operation.
• Join Liveness. A correct process that has invoked a join()
operation eventually joins the system.
• Leave Liveness. A correct participant that has invoked a
leave() operation eventually leaves the system.
It is important to notice that one could implement the
properties above (Definition 1) rather trivially by instantiating a
(static) Byzantine reliable broadcast primitive encompassing all
processes in U , whether they are participants or not. Nothing
prevents all processes from executing such a protocol. Of course,
this would be against the idea of a dynamic system where only
participants in the broadcast system execute the protocol. To
capture this constraint, we introduce a non-triviality property
that dbrb satisfies besides properties of Definition 1.
1is is a standard assumption in the literature of dynamic systems ([1, 2]),
essential to guarantee liveness. It is shown in [3] that even a regular register
can not be implemented if the system reconfigures infinitely often.
2Recall that the identity of sender process s for a given message m is
implicit in the message (§2.1).
Definition 2 (Non-triviality). A correct process does not send
any messages before invoking a join() operation and after
returning from leave() operation.
3 Overview
Here we give an overview of two scenarios: (i) a (correct) pro-
cess joining the system, and (ii) a (correct) process broadcasting
a message in the system.
3.1 Joins
To initiate the protocol for joining the broadcast system, a
correct process p invokes a join() operation. Upon doing so, p
asks processes (in the universe) about the current membership
of the broadcast system. ose in the broadcast system respond
(as we explain in §4.1). Once p learns the set S of current
participants in the system, p broadcasts a 〈reconfig, 〈+,p〉〉
message to the participants. is triggers a three-step algorithm
that processes in the system execute, as follows.
First, when any correct process q delivers the reconfig
message from p, q proposes S′ to the current participants in
the system (by broadcasting a propose message); S′ represents
the current membership of the system with addition of the
process p. is concludes the first step.
In the second step, q (and every other correct process)waits to
collect a Byzantine quorum [20] (with respect to S) of matching
propose messages. We say that processes in the system are
trying to converge on a new membership. Once q collects these
matching messages, process q broadcasts a 〈converged, S′〉
message to the current participants in the system.
In the third step, each correct process q waits to gather
converged messages from a Byzantine quorum (with respect
to S) of processes. en, q reliably broadcasts an 〈install, S′〉
message to all processes fromS′; recall that process p belongs to
S′. Upon delivering an install message for S′, process q con-
siders now that themembership of the systemhas changed toS′.
e join() operation finishes at process p once this process de-
livers the install message for S′3p. e purpose of propose,
converged and install messages is explained in details in
§4.2, whereas the given overview is presented in Figure 1.
3.2 Broadcast
A correct process s that wants to broadcast a message m
at time t with guarantees specified by definitions 1 and 2,
firstly broadcasts a prepare message to every process that
is a member of S(t). When a correct process q delivers the
prepare message for m, q sends an ack message to s that
represents q’s signed statement that s sent m to q. Once s
collects a Byzantine quorum of appropriate ack messages for
m, s includes collected signatures into amessage certificate and
injects a message certificate into a commit message sent to
every process that is a member of S(t). When a correct process3
Figure 1: Overview of a join operation.
q delivers a commit message with a valid message certificate
(a Byzantine quorum of verified statements thatm is sent by
s) form, q deliversm and confirms delivery ofm by sending a
con-commit message to s. Moreover, if the sender is malicious,
it is impossible to ensure totality without taking one additional
“all-to-all” communication step. Hence, q rebroadcasts a commit
message to processes that are members of S(t). We explain
the broadcast(m) and deliver(m) operations in details in §4.3,
whereas the given overview is presented in Figure 2.
4 e Algorithm
In this section we first describe some elementary building
blocks we use to obtain an algorithm implementing dbrb (§4.1).
We then provide the full algorithm for implementing join and
leave operations in dbrb (§4.2), as well as the broadcast and
delivery of messages (§4.3).
4.1 Building Blocks
Change. We define change= {+,−}×U , where the tuple
〈+,p〉 (resp. 〈−,p〉) indicates that process p asked to join (resp.
leave) the system.
View. A view v is composed by a set of changes
(represented by v.entries) and its associated mem-
bership (represented by v.members). Consequently,
v.members={p∈U : 〈+,p〉∈v.entries∧〈−,p〉 /∈v.entries}.
For simplicity, we use p∈ v and |v| meaning p∈ v.members
and |v.members|, respectively. Recall that we assume correct
process p can join and leave the system only once.
We say that protocol messagem sent during an execution
of dbrb is associated with view v if the last argument ofm is
v. Besides that, we say that a view v is installed in the system
if some correct process p∈v considers v as its current view and
processes prepare, commit and reconfig messages associated
with this view (see §§ 4.2 and 4.3). At any time t, we define
V (t) to be themost up-to-date view installed in the system.
We compare two views v1 and v2 by comparing their entries.
We use the notation v1 ⊂ v2 and v1 = v2 as an abbreviation
for v1.entries ⊂ v2.entries and v1.entries = v2.entries,
respectively. If v1⊂v2, then v2 ismore up-to-date than v1.
Finally: 3
• We denote by v.f the number of faulty processes that are
members of view v.
• For any view v, we assume |v|≥3v.f+1.
• We denote by v.q the size of a quorum of view v and
v.q=d |v|+v.f+12 e.
Sequence of views. A sequence of views seq is a set of
views with the additional property: ∀vi,vj∈seq :(vi 6=vj) =⇒
(vi⊂vj∨vi⊃vj).
View Discovery. ere is a question that is naturally
imposed in dbrb: How will the processes that want to join the
system find out which processes they should ”contact” in order
to indeed join the system? More generally: How can processes
discover which views are properly ”instantiated” by dbrb
during an execution? Suppose that a correct process pwants to
join the system. In order to get the necessary approval that p can
start participating in the system (broadcasting and delivering
messages), p needs to communicate with processes that are
currently in the system. How can p knowwho is in the system?
When a correct process p wants to join the system, p
broadcasts a reconfig message to the processes that are
part of the most updated view (line 19 of Algorithm 1) p has
”discovered” (line 18 of Algorithm 1). Process p continues
discovering (by flooding a network asking for current views)
new views installed in the system until p joins the system.
It is important to note that p can not be tricked by malicious
processes that want to plant views not ”instantiated” by our
3We revisit these in §5.2.4
Figure 2: Overview of a broadcast operation.
protocol. An install message ”dictates” reconfiguring from
one view to another and it carries a proof of its authenticity
(see §4.2). Processes will send all install messages they have
encountered to p and p ”builds a chain” of properly installed
views (starting from the initial view of the system) by collecting
those install messages. In this way, p gets bootstrap regarding
the system membership.
If process pwants to leave, the situation is much simpler. If p
does not deliver a Byzantine quorum of rec-confirmmessages,
p eventually delivers an install message that enforces p to
change its current view. At that point, p rebroadcasts areconfig
message to processes that are members of the new view.
Finally, by ”building a chain” of properly installed views,
a joining process p knows exactly which views are properly
”instantiated” by dbrb. us, if p delivers a message m with
a message certificate collected in some view v (see §4.3), it can
verify whether v is properly installed in the system. If it is, p
can safely deliverm.
4.2 Dynamicity
Algorithms 1 and 2 present the pseudocode of the join() and
leave() operations.
When a correct process p invokes a join() operation
(specified by the interface of our broadcast system), the dbrb
algorithm creates a mjoin = 〈reconfig, 〈+,p〉,cv〉 message
(note that cv is a local variable of p that represents p’s current
view of the system) and sendsmjoin to every process that is a
member of cv (line 19 of Algorithm 1). Process p then waits for
cv.q rec-confirm messages (line 17 of Algorithm 1). If p does
not collect a Byzantine quorum of rec-confirm message, it
eventually discovers that somemore updated view v′ is properly
installed in the system (line 18 of Algorithm 1) and sends a
m′join = 〈reconfig, 〈+,p〉,v′〉 message to processes that are
members of v′ (line 19 of Algorithm 1). Process p repeats this
until it receives a Byzantine quorum of rec-confirm messages
or event join completed occurs.
When a correct process r ∈ cv delivers mjoin from p, r
checks whether its current view is equal to cv, adds 〈+,p〉 to its
set of pending reconfiguration requests (local variableRECV ;
line 33 of Algorithm 1) and sends a rec-confirm message to p
(line 34 of Algorithm 1). After some timeout, process r proposes
a new view v′= cv∪RECV by sending a propose message
to every process that is a member of cv (line 40 of Algorithm 1).
It is important to observe that propose messages carry signed
reconfig messages for changes they propose (important for
ensuring join and leave safety; we omit this in algorithms 1
and 2). Note that scenario when some correct process pwants
to leave the system is completely equivalent, except that p
broadcasts a reconfig message with 〈−,p〉 as an argument
and r adds 〈−,p〉 to its set of pending reconfiguration requests.
Process r delivers propose messages4 from other processes
and updates its proposal (local variable SEQ) according to two
cases:
1. ere are conflicting views5 in r’s and delivered proposal
(line 45 to line 47 of Algorithm 1): In this case, r creates
a new proposal containing r’s last converged sequence
(local variable LCSEQ) and a new view representing the
union of the most up-to-date views of two proposals.
2. ere are not conflicting views in r’s and delivered
proposal (line 49 of Algorithm 1): In this case, r executes
the union of its previous and delivered proposal in order
to create a new proposal.
When r receives the same proposal from a Byzantine quorum
of processes, r stores the value of SEQ variable in LCSEQ
variable (line 53 of Algorithm 1) and broadcasts a converged
message with SEQ as an argument (line 54 of Algorithm 1).
When r delivers a converged message for some sequence
of views seq′ and some view v (usually v is equal to the current
view of process r) from a Byzantine quorum of processes that
are members of view v (line 56 of Algorithm 1), r creates and
reliably disseminates an install message that specifies the
view that should be replaced (i.e., v), the least up-to-date view
of the sequence seq′ denoted by ω (line 57 of Algorithm 1) and
the entire sequence seq′ (line 58 of Algorithm 1). An install
message is sent to processes that are members of views v
4Correct process p accepts a sequence of views seq (see §5.1) if seq ∈
FORMAT or∅∈FORMAT (line 42 ofAlgorithm1). e followingholds at
every correct process that is amember of the initial viewv0: ∅∈FORMATv0 .
5Different views v and v′ are conflicting if v 6⊂v′∧v 6⊃v′.5
and ω (line 58 of Algorithm 1). Note that install messages
include a Byzantine quorum of signed converged messages
which ensures its authenticity, i.e., that the message is properly
”instantiated” by dbrb protocol (we omit this in algorithms 1
and 2 for brevity). Lastly, since install messages carry a proof
of authenticity, reliable broadcast can be implemented by a
simple retransmission by the receiving side before the delivery.
When a correct process r delivers an install message (line 1
of Algorithm 2), r enters the reconfiguration procedure in order
to update its current view of the system. ere are three main
parts of the reconfiguration procedure:
1. Process r was a member of a view v and ω is more
up-to-date than its current view cv (lines 5 and 6 of
Algorithm 2): If this is the case, r stops processing
prepare, commit and reconfig messages (line 5 of
Algorithm 2; see §4.3). Hence, this is the point in the
execution of r when it is clear which messages r has
acknowledged (sent ack message for) and delivered. is
is important because r needs to send to members of a new
view which messages r has acknowledged and delivered
(which represents the state of process r) and therefore,
we must avoid any ambiguity, as we explain in §4.3.
2. Process r is a member of ω ⊃ cv (line 9 to line 24 of
Algorithm 2): In this case, r waits for v.q of state-update
messages (line 9 of Algorithm 2), updates its current view
(line 13 of Algorithm 2), processes received states (line 14
of Algorithm 2) and sends view-updated messages to
processes that were part of v, but are not part of ω (i.e.,
processes that want to leave; line 16 of Algorithm 2).
3. Process r is not a member of ω⊃ cv (lines 26 and 27 of
Algorithm 2): In this case, r waits for ω.q view-updated
messages (line 26 of Algorithm 2) and leaves the system
(line 27 of Algorithm 2). is is important to ensure that a
correct leaving process will participate in the reconfigura-
tion protocol that installs a new view without itself, i.e., a
correct leaving process stays available to transfer its state.
4.3 Broadcast
In order to disseminate some message m with properties
presented in definitions 1 and 2, processes that are participants
in dbrb use the following types of messages:
1. prepare: When a correct process s invokes a
broadcast(m) operation, the algorithm creates a
mprepare= 〈prepare,m,cvs〉 message, where cvs is the
current view of the system of process s. Messagemprepare
is sent to every process that is a member of cvs (line 27
of Algorithm 3). Process s broadcasts a prepare message
if cvs is installed by s; otherwise, s waits to install some
view and then broadcasts a prepare message.
2. ack: When a correct process q deliversmprepare message,
it firstly checks whether view specified in mprepare is
equal to the current view of q (line 29 of Algorithm 3).
If that is the case, q checks whether it is allowed to
send an ack message for m (see Ensuring consistency
paragraph; line 30 of Algorithm 3) and if it is, q sends
mack = 〈ack,m,σ,cvq〉 message to process s (i.e., the
sender ofmjoin), where σ represents the signed statement
that s sentm to q (line 31 of Algorithm 3). When some
process q sends an ack message for m (m is a second
argument of the message), we say that q acknowledges
m. Moreover, if the ack message is associated with some
view v, we say that q acknowledgesm in a view v.
3. commit: When process s delivers a Byzantine quorum of
appropriate ack messages associated with the same view
v form (line 37 of Algorithm 3), it collects received signed
statements into amessage certificate. Process s then creates
mcommit = 〈commit,m,cer,vcer,cvs〉 message and
broadcastsmcommit to every process that is a member of
cvs (line 39 of Algorithm 3). Note that cvs may be different
than v (we account for this in the rest of the section).
Moreover, s broadcasts a commit message (line 39 of
Algorithm 3) if cvs is installed by s; otherwise, swaits to
install some view and then broadcasts a commit message.
4. con-commit: When a correct process q deliversmcommit
message, it firstly checks whether view specified in
mcommit is equal to the current view of q (line 41 of
Algorithm 3). If that is the case and the message certificate
is valid (line 42 of Algorithm 3), q deliversm and sends
mcon−commit = 〈con-commit,m,cvq〉 to process s (i.e.,
the sender ofmcommit; line 47 of Algorithm 3). Observe
that q also relaysmcommit in order to ensure totality if the
sender ofm is malicious (lines 24 and 46 of Algorithm 3).
As it can be seen above, every prepare, ack, commit and
con-commit message is associated with one specific view.
We can divide the broadcasting of messagem by the correct
sender s into two phases:
1. Certificate collection phase: is phase includes broad-
casting of an appropriate prepare message and waiting
for a Byzantine quorum of ack messages by process s.
Note that prepare and ack messages are associated with
the same view v. We say that certificate collection phase
is executed in view v. Moreover, if s indeed delivers a
Byzantine quorum of ackmessages, we say that certificate
collection phase is successfully executed in v. In that case,
sometimes we say that s collects a message certificate in v.
2. Delivery phase: is phase includes broadcasting of a
commit message that contains a valid message certificate
collected in the previous phase andwaiting for a Byzantine
quorum of con-commit messages by process s. Note that
commit and con-commit messages are associated with
the same view v. We say that delivery phase is executed in
view v. Moreover, if s indeed delivers a Byzantine quorum
of con-commit messages, we say that delivery phase is
successfully executed in v.
Observe that the certificate collection phase can be success-
fully executed in some view v, whereas the delivery phase can
be executed in some view v′⊃ v. is is the reason why we6
Algorithm 1 dbrb algorithm for join() and leave() operations. Code for process p.
1: function least updated(seq) . returns a view v such that v is a subset of any other view v′
2: least updated=ω :(ω∈seq)∧(@ω′∈seq :ω′⊂ω)
3: return
4:
5: functionmost updated(seq) . returns a view v such that v is a superset of any other view v′
6: most updated=ω :(ω∈seq)∧(@ω′∈seq :ω⊂ω′)
7: return
8:
9: variables:
10: cv=v0 . current view of the system; v0 is the initial view of the system
11: RECV =∅ . set of pending join and leave requests
12: SEQv=∅ . proposed sequence of views to replace view v; for every view v
13: LCSEQv=∅ . last converged sequence of views to replace view v; for every view v
14: FORMATv=∅ . accepted sequence of views to replace view v; for every view v
15:
16: procedure join() . join() operation called by the user
17: while cv.q 〈rec-confirm, cv〉 messages not collected and join completed has not occurred do
18: discover cv
19: ∀k∈cv,send 〈reconfig, 〈+,p〉,cv〉 to k
20: end while
21: wait for join completed
22:
23: procedure leave() . leave() operation called by the user
24: stop triggering broadcast(m) and deliver(m)
25: wait until validity is ensured if some message is broadcast and totality is ensured if some message is delivered
26: while cv.q 〈rec-confirm, cv〉 messages not collected and leave completed has not occurred do
27: discover cv
28: ∀k∈cv,send 〈reconfig, 〈−,p〉,cv〉 to k
29: end while
30: wait for leave completed
31:
32: upon receipt of 〈reconfig, 〈∗,q〉,cv〉 from q such that 〈∗,q〉 /∈cv
33: RECV =RECV ∪{〈∗,q〉}
34: send 〈rec-confirm, cv〉 to q
35:
36: upon timeout(cv)∧RECV 6=∅ do
37: seq={cv∪RECV }
38: if SEQcv=∅∧∀ω∈seq :cv⊂ω then
39: SEQcv=seq
40: ∀k∈cv,send 〈propose, SEQcv,cv〉 to k
41:
42: upon receipt of 〈propose, seq,v〉 from q∈v such that seq∈FORMATv∨∅∈FORMATv
43: if ∃ω∈seq :ω /∈SEQv∧∀ω∈seq :v⊂ω∧∀ω,ω′∈seq :(ω 6=ω′) =⇒ (ω⊂ω′∨ω⊃ω′) then
44: if ∃ω,ω′ :ω∈seq∧ω′∈SEQv∧ω 6⊂ω′∧ω′ 6⊂ω then . check whether there are conflicting views
45: ω=most updated(seq) . take the ”last” view from q’s proposal
46: ω′=most updated(SEQv) . take the ”last” view from p’s proposal
47: SEQv=LCSEQv∪{ω.entries∪ω′.entries} .merge them
48: else
49: SEQv=SEQv∪seq . there are no conflicting views; just merge the proposals
50: ∀k∈v,send 〈propose, SEQv,v〉 to k
51:
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52: upon receipt of 〈propose, SEQv,v〉 from v.q processes in v
53: LCSEQv=SEQv
54: ∀k∈v,send 〈converged, SEQv,v〉 to k
55:
56: upon receipt of 〈converged, seq′,v〉 from v.q processes in v
57: ω=least updated(seq′)
58: R-mutlicast({j :j∈v∨j∈ω},〈install, ω,seq′,v〉)
59:
Algorithm 2 dbrb algorithm for installing a view. Code for
process p.
1: upon R-delivery({j :j∈v∨j∈ω},〈install, ω,seq,v〉) do
2: FORMATω=FORMATω∪{seq\{ω}}
3: if p∈v then . pwas a member of v
4: if cv⊂ω then . p’s current view is less updated than ω
5: stop processing prepare, commit and reconfig messages
6: ∀k∈ω,send 〈state-update, State,RECV 〉 to k
7: if cv⊂ω then . ω is more updated than p’s current view
8: if p∈ω then . p is in ω
9: wait for 〈state-update, ∗,∗〉messages fromv.q processes inv
10: req = {reconfiguration requests from state-update
messages}
11: RECV =RECV ∪req\ω.entries
12: states={states from state-update messages}
13: cv=ω
14: trigger state-transfer(states) . Algorithm 3
15: if p /∈v then join completed . can return from join()
16: ∀k∈v\cv,send 〈view-updated, cv〉 to k
17: if ∃ω′∈seq :cv⊂ω′ then
18: seq′ ={ω′∈seq :cv⊂ω′}
19: if SEQcv=∅∧∀ω∈seq′ :cv⊂ω then
20: SEQcv=seq′
21: ∀k∈cv,send 〈propose, SEQcv,cv〉 to k
22: else
23: resume processing prepare, commit and reconfig
messages and start a timer for cv
24: trigger new-view() . Algorithm 3
25: else . p is leaving the system
26: wait for 〈view-updated,ω〉messages fromω.q processes inω
27: leave completed . can return from leave()
28:
need to include vcer argument in a commit message, which
represents the view in which message certificate is collected.
Example of an execution. Consider four processes in
the system at time t = 0. Moreover, process p1 broad-
casts a message m. Hence, p1 sends to processes p1, p2,
p3, p4 a mprepare = 〈prepare,m,v0〉 message, where
v0 = {〈+, p1〉, 〈+, p2〉, 〈+, p3〉, 〈+, p4〉}. Since all processes
consider v0 as their current view of the system at time of
delivering ofmprepare message, they send to p1 an appropriate
ack message and p1 collects a Byzantine quorum (with respect
to v0) of ack messages form.
However, process p5 invokes a join() oper-
ation and processes p2, p3, p4, p5 set v1 =
{〈+, p1〉, 〈+, p2〉, 〈+, p3〉, 〈+, p4〉, 〈+, p5〉} as their current
view of the system. Process p1 still considers v0 as its
current view of the system and broadcasts a mcommit =
〈commit,m,cer,vcer=v0,v0〉 message. Processes p2, p3 and
p4 do not deliverm, since v0 (specified inmcommit message)
is not their current view. Observe that p1 deliversm since v0
is still the current view of the system from p1’s perspective.
Once process p1 assigns v1 as its current view of the
system, it broadcastsmcommit=〈commit,m,cer,vcer=v0,v1〉
message to processes that are members of v1 and they all
deliver m. In this execution p1 has successfully executed a
certificate collection phase in v0 and then reused the message
certificate to relay an appropriate commit message to processes
that are members of v1 (since the system reconfigured to v1).
Figure 3 depicts the described execution.
Ensuring validity. A correct process s that broadcasts a
messagemmust successfully execute certificate collection and
delivery phases in order to ensure validity.
Process s does not leave the system before s has ensured va-
lidity form that s previously broadcast (line 25 of Algorithm 1).
Recall that we assume a finite number of reconfiguration
requests (Assumption 2), which means that there exists a view
vfinal from which system will not be reconfigured (we prove
this in §5.2).
A correct process s that broadcasts a message m executes
a certificate collection phase in some view v (the current view
of s). Even if s does not successfully execute a certificate
collection phase in views that precede vfinal in the sequence
of installed views (we prove that installed views in the system
form a sequence in §5.2), s successfully executes a certificate
collection phase in vfinal.
Consider a scenario where a correct process swants to leave
the system, but sdidnot previously ensure validity form. Hence,
s can not collect a message certificate in vfinal, because s /∈
vfinal. However, it is guaranteed thatswill collect amessage cer-
tificate in a view v′final at last, where v′final includes every pos-
sible reconfiguration request that can be proposed in the execu-
tion, except 〈−,s〉. Lastly, note that there can be processes other
than s that did not ensure validity for some of their messages (in
a more general version of dbrb where multiple processes can
broadcast multiple messages). We can apply the same reasoning
and show that eventually every correct process ensures validity
for each message previously broadcast (proven in §5.4).
Observe that if at least a Byzantine quorum of processes8
Figure 3: Example of a broadcast operation in our dbrb algorithm, considering a dynamic membership.
that are members of some installed view v deliver a messagem,
then every correct process p∈v′, where view v′⊃v is installed,
deliversm. Let us give an intuition behind this claim.
Suppose that view v′ directly succeeds view v in the sequence
of views installed in the system. Process p ∈ v′ waits for
states from at least a Byzantine quorum of processes that were
members of v before it updates its current view to v′ (line 9 of
Algorithm 2 and line 13 of Algorithm 3). Hence, p receives from
at least one process thatm is delivered and then p deliversm.
A correct process q that delivers a commit message form
checks whether aforementioned commit message is associated
with a view equal to its current view of the system. If this is
the case, it sends a con-commit message to a sender which
represents a confirmation that q has delivered m. When a
sender collects a Byzantine quorum (with respect to some
installed view) of confirmations that a commit message is
indeed delivered, it can stop rebroadcastingm in subsequent
views because of the previous argument. Even if a correct
sender does not collect a quorum of con-commit messages
in views that precede vfinal, it must collect the quorum when
rebroadcasting in vfinal (or v′final as explained above).
Suppose that the sender collects an aforementioned quorum
of con-commitmessages in some installed view v. If v 6=vfinal,
every correct member of vfinal delivers m (because of the
previous argument). If v=vfinal, reliable links and the fact that
the system can not be further reconfigured guarantee that every
correct member of vfinal deliversm. Hence, validity is ensured.
Ensuring totality. e intuition behind ensuring totality of
dbrb is similar to the logic behind ensuring validity. Suppose
that a correct process p delivers a message m. In order to
ensure totality, p must relay message m (lines 24 and 46
of Algorithm 3) until p collects a quorum of con-commit
messages from processes that are members of some installed
view v. If v 6=vfinal, every correct member of vfinal deliversm
(because of the argument we made in the previous paragraph).
If v=vfinal, reliable links and fact that the system can not be
further reconfigured guarantee that every correct member of
vfinal deliversm. Hence, totality is ensured.
Ensuring consistency. Suppose that process s has success-
fully executed a certificate collection phase in some view v for
some messagem. Because of the quorum intersection and the
verification at line 30 of Algorithm 3, it is impossible for s to
collect a valid message certificate in v for somemessagem′ 6=m.
However, it is possible for s to collect a message certificate
form′ in some view v′⊃v. Assume that all processes that are
members of v later consider a view v′ as their current view
of the system. Malicious sender s now broadcasts a message
m′ 6=m and it is possible that new processes, which are not
aware of the fact that s broadcastm previously, acknowledge
m′ (send an ack message associated with v′ for m). us, s
can collect a message certificate again, but now for m′. is
implies that consistency can be violated.
e reasoning behind our strategy to deal with the depicted
scenario starts with the fact that the existence of a message
certificate for m implies that at least a Byzantine quorum of
processes that are members of some view have sent an ack
message associated with that view form.
Let us analyse again the presented examplewhich shows how
amalicious sender can collect message certificates form andm′.
Suppose that there is a correct process p, such that p∈v′∧p /∈v
(i.e., p has just joined the system). Clearly, p can be a process
that malicious sender s targets in order to equivocate since p is
not aware that s broadcast messagem previously. Since s has
collected a message certificate form in v, at least a quorum of9
processes in v have acknowledgedm. Moreover, reconfigura-
tion protocol ensures that p receives from at least one correct
process q that q has acknowledgedm (because of the quorum
intersection; line 9 of Algorithm 2 and line 14 of Algorithm 3).
Finally, in order to prevent a potential equivocation, if p receives
a preparemessage for somemessagem′ fromprocess s, p sends
an ack message only ifm′=m (line 30 of Algorithm 3).
5 Proof of dbrb Correctness
5.1 Preliminary Definitions
Definition 3. Suppose that a correct process p ∈ v broadcasts
a 〈propose, seq,v〉message at line 40 of Algorithm 1 or at line 21
of Algorithm 2. We say that p proposes a sequence of views seq
to replace a view v.
Definition 4. Suppose that a correct process p ∈ v collects a
Byzantine quorum (with respect to v) of 〈converged, seq,v〉
messages (line 56 of Algorithm 1). We say that p converges on
a sequence of views seq to replace a view v.
Definition 5. We say that a sequence of views seq is converged
on to replace a view v if some (correct or faulty) process p ∈ v
collects a Byzantine quorum (with respect to v) of 〈converged,
seq,v〉messages.
Definition 6. Suppose that seq ∈ FORMATv at a correct
process p for some view v3p. We say that p accepts a sequence
of views seq to replace a view v. Moreover, if ∅∈FORMATv,
then p accepts any sequence to replace v.
Definition 7. We say that a sequence of views seq is accepted
to replace a view v if some correct process p∈ v accepts seq to
replace v.
We prove in §5.2 that if seq is converged on or a correct
process proposes seq to replace some view, then seq is a
sequence of views. Finally, if seq is accepted to replace some
view, then seq is a sequence of views.
5.2 Preliminary Lemmata
Definition 8. We say that view v is valid if one of the following
holds:
• View v is the initial view of the system; or
• Some sequence of views seq= v→ v1→ ...→ vn,(n≥ 0)
is converged on to replace some valid view v′.
Otherwise, we say that view v is invalid.
e assumptions regarding the quorum size and number of
faulty processes in a view (see §4.1) apply only to valid views, i.e.,
only valid views need to satisfy the aforementioned assumptions.
Moreover, correct processes process propose, converged and
install messages only if they are associated with valid views.
Lastly, a correct process p delivers some message m which
Algorithm 3 dbrb algorithm for broadcast(m) and
deliver(m) operations. Code for process p.
1: variables:
2: cer=⊥ .message certificate form
3: vcer=⊥ . view in which certificate is collected
4: validity=false . validity form is ensured or not
5: totality=false . totality form is ensured or not
6: delivered=false . m delivered or not
7: acks[q,v]=⊥;Σ[q,v]=⊥;concommits[q,v]=⊥ .
for every process q∈U and every view v
8:
9: upon Init do
10: p is allowed to acknowledge anym
11:
12: procedure state-transfer(states)
13: (1) p deliversm if p has not delivered any message and some process
q claims that it has deliveredmwith a valid message certificate
14: (2) p is allowed to acknowledge m if only m is acknowledged by
processes that have sent their state
15: (3) p is not allowed to acknowledge any message if some process q
has acknowledgedm and some process r m′
16: (4) p is not allowed to acknowledge any message if some process q
claims that p should not acknowledge any message and provides p with
two different messages s broadcast
17:
18: procedure new-view()
19: if p=s∧cer=⊥ then
20: ∀k∈cv,send 〈prepare,m,cv〉 to k
21: if p=s∧cer 6=⊥∧validity=false then
22: ∀k∈cv,send 〈commit,m,cer,vcer,cv〉 to k
23: if p 6=s∧delivered=true∧totality=false then
24: ∀k∈cv,send 〈commit,m,cer,vcer,cv〉 to k
25:
26: procedure broadcast(m) . operation called by the user
27: ∀k∈cv,send 〈prepare,m,cv〉 to k
28:
29: upon receipt of 〈prepare,m,v〉 from s∈v such that v=cv
30: if p is allowed to acknowledgem and p has not sent any ack message
associated with v then
31: σ=sign(m,cv); send 〈ack,m,σ,cv〉 to s
32:
33: upon receipt of 〈ack,m,σ,v〉 from q∈v . only process s
34: if acks[q,v]=⊥∧verifysig(q,m,v,σ) then
35: acks[q,v]=m; Σ[q,v]=σ
36:
37: upon exists m 6= ⊥ and v such that #({q ∈ v|acks[q,v] = m}) ≥
v.q∧cer=⊥ do
38: cer={Σ[q,v] :acks[q,v]=m}; vcer=v
39: ∀k∈cv,send 〈commit,m,cer,vcer,cv〉 to k
40:
41: upon receipt of 〈commit,m,cer,vcer,v〉 from q∈v such that v=cv
42: if verifycertificate(cer,vcer,m) then
43: if delivered=false then
44: delivered=true
45: trigger deliver(m)
46: ∀k∈cv,send 〈commit,m,cer,vcer,cv〉 to k
47: send 〈con-commit,m,cv〉 to q
48:
49: upon receipt of 〈con-commit,m,v〉 from q∈v
50: if concommits[q,v]=⊥ then
51: concommits[q,v]=>
52:
53: upon exists v such that #({q ∈ v|concommits[q, v] = >}) ≥
v.q for the first time do
54: if p=s then
55: validity=true
56: totality=true
57:
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message certificate is collected in some view v once p ”discovers”
that view v is valid (Lemma 21 proves that v is installed).
Lemma 1. Suppose that seq is converged on to replace some
valid view v. en, seq is a sequence of views, i.e., the following
holds: ∀vi,vj∈seq :(vi 6=vj) =⇒ (vi⊂vj∨vi⊃vj).
Proof. Since seq is converged on, a correct process p∈v sent
a propose message with seq. e value of SEQv variable is
sent inside of a propose message. Suppose that the value of
SEQv is a sequence of views. We analyze two possible ways
for modifying the SEQv variable of p:
• ere are no conflicting views upon delivering a propose
message (line 49 of Algorithm 1): New value of SEQv
is a sequence of views because of the fact that there are no
conflicting views and both value of SEQv and sequence
received in a propose message (because of the verification
at line 43 of Algorithm 1) are sequences of views.
• ere are conflicting views upon delivering a propose
message (line 45 to line 47 of Algorithm 1): Suppose that
p has delivered a propose message with seq′. Because
of the verification at line 43 of Algorithm 1, seq′ is a
sequence of views. Moreover, LCSEQv variable of p
is either SEQv or a subset of SEQv. After executing
line 47 of Algorithm 1, the union of two most updated
views results in a view with greater cardinality than the
”last” view of LCSEQv and LCSEQv is a sequence of
views (or LCSEQv=∅). Hence, value of SEQv variable
is a sequence of views.
A set with just one view is, trivially, a sequence of views. We
proved that two sequences of views ”produce” a sequence of
views which ensures that lemma holds.
Lemma 1 proves that if seq is converged on to replace some
valid view v, then seq is a sequence of views. Moreover, since
a set with a single view is a sequence of views and a correct
process proposes seq to replace some valid view at line 40 of
Algorithm 1 or at line 21 of Algorithm 2, proposed seq is a
sequence of views. Similarly, if seq is accepted to replace some
valid view, then seq is a sequence of views.
Lemma 2. Suppose that sequences of views seq1 and seq2
are converged on to replace some valid view v. en, either
seq1⊆seq2 or seq1⊃seq2.
Proof. Suppose that some process p ∈ v has collected a
Byzantine quorum of converged messages for seq1 to replace
a view v. Moreover, suppose that process q∈v has collected a
Byzantine quorum of converged messages for seq2 to replace
v. is means that there is at least one correct process k∈v that
has sent converged message both for seq1 and seq2. Suppose
that k first sent converged message for seq1 and seq1 6=seq2.
At the moment of sending of a converged message for
seq1 (line 54 of Algorithm 1), the following holds for k’s local
variables: LCSEQv= seq1 and SEQv= seq1. On the other
hand, SEQv = seq2 when k sent a converged message for
seq2. us, we need to prove that SEQv includes seq1 from
the moment k has sent a converged message for seq1.
ere are two ways for modifying SEQv local variable:
• Process k receives a propose message for some sequence
of views seq and there are no conflicting views in SEQv
and seq (line 49 of Algorithm 1): Since SEQv contains
seq1 and the simple union is performed, the resulting
sequence of views contains seq1.
• Process k receives a propose message for some sequence
of views seq and there are conflicting views in SEQv and
seq (line 45 to line 47 of Algorithm 1): Since LCSEQv
contains seq1 and LCSEQv participates in the union,
the resulting sequence of views contains seq1.
We proved that SEQv always contains seq1 after converged
message for seq1 is sent. Consequently, the following holds:
seq1⊂seq2.
Using similar arguments, it is possible to prove the symmet-
rical execution: if process k sent converged message for seq2
and then for seq1, we have that seq1⊃seq2. Lastly, processes
could have collected the converged messages for the same
sequence and then we have seq1=seq2.
Lemma 3. Suppose that a sequence of views seq is converged
on to replace some valid view v. en, the following holds:
∀ω∈seq :v⊂ω.
Proof. Lemma holds because of the verifications at lines 38
and 43 of Algorithm 1 and at line 19 of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 4. Suppose that a correct process p ∈ v proposes a
sequence of views seqp to replace some valid view v. en, p
eventually converges on a sequence of views seq′p to replace v.
Proof. When p proposes seqp to replace v, p broadcasts a
〈propose, seqp,v〉message. Since we assume reliable links for
communication between processes, messages sent by correct
processes are received by correct processes. For process p to
converge on a sequence of views seq′p to replace v, at least v.q
processes should send a converged message for seq′p. During
this period, p changes the value of its variable SEQv with
sequences of views received from other processes. Since there
are at least v.q correct processes in v and a finite number of
reconfiguration requests (i.e., even a malicious process can not
propose new views an infinite number of times; Assumption 2),
at least v.q processes are going to send a converged message
for the same sequence. Hence, p eventually converges on seq′p
to replace a view v.
Lemma 5. Suppose that a sequence of views seq is converged on
to replace some valid view v. en, seq is accepted to replace v.
Proof. Suppose that seq is converged on to replace v. is
implies that at least v.q processes have sent a propose message
with seq as an argument. ere is a correct process p∈v that
has sent an aforementioned propose message. Hence, p accepts
seq (before sending a proposal, p executes line 2 of Algorithm 2
or v is the initial view of the system) and lemma holds.11
Definition 9. We say that a valid view v is installable if one
of the following holds:
• View v is the initial view of the system; or
• Some sequence of views seq=v (a sequence of views with
just view v) is converged on to replace some valid view v′.
Otherwise, we say that view v is not installable.
Lemma 6. Consider a valid view v which is not installable. If
sequence of views seq= v1→ ...→ vn,(n≥ 1) is converged on
to replace v, then a sequence of views seq′=v→v1→ ...→vn
is converged on to replace some valid view v′.
Proof. Lemma 5 shows that seq is accepted to replace v. Hence,
some correct process p executed line 2 of Algorithm 2 upon
delivering an install message associated with some valid view
v′ and with some sequence seq′. Because of the fact that v is
not installable and seq′\{v}=seq (line 2 of Algorithm 2) and
v⊂v1 (Lemma 3), we conclude that seq′=v→v1→ ...→vn.
Hence, lemma holds.
Lemma 7. Consider a valid view v which is not installable. If
sequence of views seq=v1→ ...→vn,(n≥1) is converged on to
replace v, then a sequence of views seq′=v′1→ ...→v′m→v→
v1→ ...→vn,(m≥0) is converged on to replace some installable
view v′ and views v′1,...,v
′
m are not installable.
Proof. A sequence of views seq′′ = v → v1 → ... → vn is
converged on to replace some valid view v′ (Lemma 6). If v′
is installable, then lemma holds.
Suppose that v′ is not installable. Because of the fact that v′
is valid and Lemma 6, we can conclude that a sequence of views
seq′′′=v′→v→v1→ ...→vn is converged on to replace some
valid view v′′. Again, if v′′ is installable, then lemma holds.
We can apply the same argument a finite number of times.
is is due to the fact that the initial view of the system is
installable and unique and there is a finite number of processes
invoking join() and leave() operations in any execution
(Assumption 2). Hence, lemma holds.
Lemma 8. Consider an installable view v different than
the initial view of the system. en, a sequence of views
seq=v1→v2→ ...→vn→v,(n≥0) is converged on to replace
some installable view v′ and views v1,v2,...,vn are not installable.
Proof. A sequence of views seq=v is converged on to replace
some valid view v′ (Definition 9). If v′ is installable, then lemma
holds.
Suppose that v′ is not installable. Lemma 7 proves that a
sequence of views seq= v′1→ ...→ v′m→ v′→ v,(m≥ 0) is
converged on to replace some installable view v′′ and views
v′1,...,v
′
m are not installable. Hence, lemma holds.
Definition 10. Consider views v and v′ installable in the system.
Suppose that a sequence of views seq=v1→ ...→vn→v′,(n≥0)
is converged on to replace v and views v1,...,vn are not installable.
We say that v leads to v′.
Lemma 9. Consider an installable view v. If v leads to v′ and
v leads to v′′, then v′=v′′.
Proof. Because of the Definition 10, sequences of views seq′=
...→ v′ and seq′′ = ...→ v′′ are converged on to replace v.
Lemma 2 ensures that the following holds: seq′⊆seq′′ or seq′⊃
seq′′. Suppose that v′ 6=v′′ and let us analyze two possible cases:
• seq′=seq′′: In this case, v′=v′′ and lemma holds.
• seq′ 6=seq′′: Without loss of generality, we suppose that
v′⊂v′′. en we have two cases:
– seq′ ⊂ seq′′: In this case, we can conclude that
v′ ∈ seq′′. Hence, Definition 10 is not satisfied for
v′′ since v′ is installable. erefore, v leads only to
v′ and lemma holds.
– seq′ ⊃ seq′′: We can conclude that v′′ ∈ seq′ and
v′′⊂v′ (since v′ is the ”last” view of seq′). is is con-
flicting with the fact that v′⊂v′′. us, lemma holds.
Lemma 10. Consider an installable view v. If v′ leads to v and
v′′ leads to v, then v′=v′′.
Proof. Suppose that v′ 6=v′′. Suppose that some view vp1 leads
to v′ and vp2 leads to v′′. If vp1 =vp2 , then this view leads to
two different views, which is a contradiction with Lemma 9.
Hence, lemma holds.
If vp1 6=vp2 , we can consider views that lead to vp1 and vp2
and apply the same argument. Because of the fact the initial view
of the system is installable and unique, we can conclude that
there exists an installable view that leads to two different views.
is contradicts Lemma 9, which implies that lemma holds.
Lemma 11. Consider an installable view v that leads to v′.
Suppose that a sequence of views seq is converged on to replace
v, then v′∈seq.
Proof. Some sequence of views seq′ = ...→ v′ is converged
on to replace v (Definition 10). Now, some sequence seq is
converged on to replace v. Lemma 2 ensures that seq⊃ seq′.
Hence, v′∈seq.
Lemma 12. Consider a valid view v which is not installable.
en, a sequence of views seq=v′1→ ...→v′m→v→v1→ ...→
vn,(m≥0,n≥1) is converged on to replace some installable view
v′ and views v′1,...,v
′
m are not installable.
Proof. A sequence of views seq′= v→ v1→ ...→ vn,(n≥ 1)
is converged on to replace some valid view v′ (definitions 8
and 9). If v′ is installable, then lemma holds.
Suppose that v′ is not installable. Lemma 7 proves that a
sequence of views seq=v′1→ ...→v′m→v′→v→v1→ ...→
vn,(m≥0) is converged on to replace some installable view v′′
and views v′1,...,v′m are not installable. Hence, lemmaholds.
Lemma 13. Consider a valid view v which is not installable.
Suppose that a sequence of views seq=v1→ ...→vk→v→ ...→
vn,(k≥0,n≥1) is converged on to replace some installable viewv′12
and a sequence of views seq′=v′1→ ...→v′j→v→ ...→v′′m,(j≥
0,m≥1) is converged on to replace some installable view v′′ and
views v1,...,vk and v′1,...,v
′
j are not installable. en, v
′=v′′.
Proof. Suppose that v′ 6= v′′. Let us say that some view vp1
leads to v′ and that some view vp2 leads to v′′ (Lemma 10). If
vp1 = vp2 , then this view leads to two different views, which
is a contradiction with Lemma 9. Hence, lemma holds.
If vp1 6=vp2 , we can consider views that lead to vp1 and vp2
and apply the same argument. Because of the fact the initial
view of the system is installable and unique, we can conclude
that there exists an installable view such that it leads to two
different views. is contradicts Lemma 9, which implies that
lemma holds.
Definition 11. Consider a valid view v which is
not installable. Suppose that a sequence of views
seq′=v′1→ ...→v′m→v→v1→ ...→vn,(m≥0,n≥1) is con-
verged on to replace some installable view v′ and views v′1,...,v
′
m
are not installable. We say that v is an auxiliary view for v′.
Lemma 14. Consider a view v which is an auxiliary view for
v′ and v′′. en, v′=v′′.
Proof. is follows directly from Lemma 13 and Defini-
tion 11.
Lemma 15. Consider a view v which is an auxiliary view
for v′. If a sequence of views seq = v1 → ... → vn,(n ≥ 1)
is converged on to replace v, then a sequence of views
seq′=v′1→ ...→v′m→v→v1→ ...→vn,(m≥0) is converged
on to replace v′ and views v′1,...,v
′
m are not installable.
Proof. is follows directly from Lemma 7 and Defini-
tion 11.
Lemma 16. Consider a view v which is an auxiliary view for
v′. Suppose that v′ leads to v′′. If sequence of views seq=v1→
...→vn,(n≥1) is converged on to replace v, then v′′∈seq.
Proof. Lemma 15 shows that some sequence of views
seq′ = v′1→ ...→ v′m→ v→ v1→ ...→ vn,(m≥ 0,n≥ 1) is
converged on to replace v′. Lemma 11 ensures that v′′∈seq′.
e fact that v′′⊃v ensures that v′′∈seq.
Lemma 9 proves that an installable view v can lead only to
one view v′ because some sequence of views seq= ...→v′ is
converged on to replace v. Moreover, consider a case when two
sequences of views seq1 and seq2 are converged on to replace a
view v. en, Lemma 2 shows that seq1⊆seq2 or seq1⊃seq2.
is implies that if some sequence of views seq′= ...→v′′ is
converged on to replace v, then v′∈seq′ (proven by Lemma 11).
Consider the following example. Suppose that the initial view
of the system v0 leads to v1 which leads to v2 (Figure 4 depicts
this scenario). A sequence of views seq= ...→v1 is converged
on to replace v0 (Definition 10). Besides that, a sequence of views
seq′ = ...→ v2 is converged on to replace v1 (Definition 10).
Suppose now that a sequence of views seq′′= ...→v3 is con-
verged on to replace v0. Lemma 11 shows that v1∈seq′′. Hence,
some sequence of views seq′′′ with v3 must be converged on to
replace v1 in order for v3 to be installable (line 21 ofAlgorithm2).
However, Lemma 11 then ensures that seq′′′ contains v2.
Finally, Lemma 16 ensures that sequences of views converged
on to replace some view va which is an auxiliary view for v0
must include v1. us, it is guaranteed that installable views
will form a sequence.
In conclusion, Lemma 11 proves that if some sequence of
views seq is converged on to replace an installable view vwhich
leads to v′, then v′∈seq. Informally, this implies that v′ plays its
role in processing seq (line 21 of Algorithm 2)which is sufficient
to ensure that no branching with respect to views will ever
happen (because of Lemma 2). Lemma 16 proves the same point,
just from the perspective of an auxiliary (not installable) view.
Figure 4: Installable views form a sequence.
Lemma 17. e installable views in the system form a sequence.
Proof. Suppose that a view ω1 is an installable view. View ω1
leads to some view ω2 (Lemma 9). e same argument can
be applied inductively to any number of views, and thus it is
possible to see that the installable views in the system form a
sequence ω1→ω2→ ...→ωk−1→ωk.
Lemma 18. e views installed in the system form a sequence.
Proof. is lemma follows directly from the fact that the set
of installed views is a subset of the set of installable views and
Lemma 17.
Lemma19. e reconfiguration of the system eventually finishes.13
Proof. System starts from the initial view v0. e system
reconfiguration starts when some sequence of views to replace
v0 is converged on. System reconfigures to some view v1⊃v0.
Again, new sequences are proposed to replace v1 which leads
to a convergence on some sequence to replace v1. However,
there will be some view vfinal such that no proposal to replace
vfinal will be issued since RECV = ∅ in all processes that
are members of vfinal (Assumption 2). At this point, the
reconfiguration of the system is finished.
5.3 Dynamicity
Recall that the set of installed views is a subset of the set of instal-
lable views. Hence, if view v is installed, then v is installable. We
say that V (t) is themost up-to-date view installed in the system.
Lemma 20. Suppose that a correct process p invokes a
join()/leave() operation at time t, by broadcasting a reconfig
message to processes that are members of V (t). Moreover,
suppose that p receives V (t).q rec-confirm messages. en,
there will be a view V (t′ > t), such that V (t) 6= V (t′), where
〈+,p〉/〈−,p〉∈V (t′).
Proof. Let us say that a correct process p broadcasts amjoin=
〈reconfig, 〈+,p〉,cv〉message, where cv=V (t), to processes
that are members of V (t) at time t. Two cases are possible:
1. All correct processes in V (t) propose a sequence of views
with a view that contains c= 〈+,p〉 to replace V (t). In
this case, the fact that all proposed sequences of correct
processes include a view with change c ensures that there
will be a view V (t′), such that t′>t∧V (t′) 6=V (t), where
c∈V (t′).
2. Some correct processes in V (t) propose a sequence, before
the receipt of mjoin, with a view that does not contain
c. In this case, considering a time t′>t when there is a
new view V (t′) installed, two scenarios are possible:
(a) c ∈ V (t′): since the proposed sequences from
processes that receivedmjoin and proposed a view
with cwere computed in V (t′).
(b) c 6∈V (t′): however, c was sent to all processes that
are members of V (t′) (line 11 of Algorithm 2) that
will propose a sequence that contains a view v′, such
that c∈v′, to replace V (t′), reducing this situation
to the first case.
Clearly, the same argument can be made when a correct process
p wants to leave the system. erefore, in any case there
will be a view V (t′), such that V (t′) 6= V (t)∧ t′ > t, where
〈+,p〉/〈−,p〉∈V (t′).
eorem 1 (Join Liveness). A correct process that has invoked
a join() operation eventually joins the system.
Proof. Suppose that a correct process p executes a
join() operation at time t, by sending a mjoin =
〈reconfig, 〈+,p〉,cv=V (t)〉 message to processes that
are members of V (t) and receives V (t).q rec-confirm mes-
sages. Lemma 20 claims that there will be a view V (t′), such
that V (t′) 6=V (t)∧t′>t, where 〈+,p〉∈V (t′). Consequently,
when V (t′) is installed at process p, the join of process p is
completed.
eorem 2 (Leave Liveness). A correct participant that has
invoked a leave() operation eventually leaves the system.
Proof. Suppose that a correct participant p exe-
cutes a leave() operation at time t, by sending a
mleave = 〈reconfig, 〈−,p〉,cv=V (t)〉 message to processes
that are members of V (t) and receives V (t).q rec-confirm
messages. Lemma 20 claims that therewill be a viewV (t′), such
that V (t′) 6=V (t)∧t′>t, where 〈−,p〉∈V (t′). Consequently,
when V (t′) is installed in the system, process p delivers
view-updated messages and leaves the system.
eorem 3 (Join Safety). If a correct process p is a participant
in the system at time t, then p has invoked a join() operation
or p was a participant in the system at time t′=0.
Proof. Since process p is a participant in the system at time t,
there must be a view v3p installed in the system. is implies
that some process z proposed a sequence of views containing
view v′ such that 〈+, p〉 ∈ v′.entries to replace some view
pv⊂v. Since processes do not process propose messages that
contain a view with 〈+,p〉without a signed reconfig message
from process p (which we omit in Algorithm 1 for brevity), p
must have invoked a join() operation.
If that is not the case, then pmust have been a member of the
initial view (i.e., a participant in the system at time t′=0).
eorem 4 (Leave Safety). If a correct process p is not a
participant in the system at time t and p was a participant in the
system at time t′<t, then p has invoked a leave() operation.
Proof. Since process p is not a participant in the system at
time t, there must be a view v 63p installed in the system. is
implies that some process z proposed a sequence of views
containing view v′ such that 〈−, p〉 ∈ v′.entries to replace
some view pv⊂v (because pwas a participant in the system).
Since processes do not process propose messages that contain
a view with 〈−,p〉 without a signed reconfig message from
process p (which we omit in Algorithm 1 for brevity), pmust
have invoked a leave() operation.
5.4 Broadcast
Definition 12. Suppose that sender s of the messagem delivers
v.q 〈ack,m,σ,v〉messages for some valid view v (line 37 of Al-
gorithm 3). We say that s collects a message certificate form in v.
Lemma 21. Suppose that some (correct or faulty) process s
collects a message certificate for a messagem in some valid view
v. en, v is installed in the system.14
Proof. Since s delivers v.q ack messages associated with v for
m, a correct process p∈v sent an ack message associated with
v for m to s. Because of the fact that p processes a prepare
message associated with view v only if v is installed by p,
lemma holds.
Lemma 22. If message m is delivered by a correct process q,
then the sender s has collected a message certificate form in some
installed view v.
Proof. Process q verifies the message certificate form (lines 13
and 42 of Algorithm 3) prior to delivering m. Hence, s has
collected a message certificate form in some installed view v
(Lemma 21).
Lemma 23. Suppose that view v is the most up-to-date view
installed in the system at time t, i.e., V (t) = v. If process s
broadcasts a messagem at time t, then s can not collect a message
certificate form in some view v′⊂v.
Proof. Note that in order for s to collect a message certificate
form in some view v′, v′ must be installed in the system and s
must send amprepare=〈prepare,m,v′〉message to processes
that are members of v′ (line 27 of Algorithm 3). A correct
process q sends an appropriate ack message formprepare only
if v′ is the current view of q and q processes prepare messages
associated with v′.
Let us say that there is a correct process z that considers
v=V (t) as its current view at time t and processes prepare,
commit and reconfig messages (i.e., v = V (t) is installed
by z). Without loss of generality, consider that v′ is a view
immediately before v in the sequence of installed views
(Lemma 18). Consequently, at least v′.q processes that are
members of v′ stopped processing preparemessages associated
with v′ (line 5 of Algorithm 2). [1] Suppose that s has collected a
message certificate in v′. at means that at least v′.q processes
have sent an ack message when they have received a 〈prepare,
m,v′〉 message. [2] From [1] and [2], we can conclude that
at least one correct process has firstly stopped processing
prepare messages associated with v′ and then processed a
prepare message associated with v′. is is conflicting with
the behaviour of a correct process. Hence, process s can not
collect a valid message certificate form in v′.
eorem 5 (No duplication). No correct participant delivers
more than one message.
Proof. e verifications at lines 13 and 43 of Algorithm 3 ensure
that no message is delivered more than once.
eorem 6 (Integrity). If some correct participant delivers a
message m with sender s and s is correct, then s previously
broadcastm.
Proof. Suppose that a correct participant q delivers a message
m. atmeans that there is amessage certificate form collected
in some installed view v by s (Lemma 22). A message certificate
form is collected since a quorum of processes in v have sent
an appropriate ack message for m. A correct process sends
an ack message only when it receives an appropriate prepare
message. Consequently, messagemwas broadcast by s.
Lemma 24. Suppose that process s has collected a message
certificate for a messagem in some installed view v. If s has also
collected a message certificate for a messagem′ in v, thenm=m′.
Proof. Because of the quorum intersection, there is at least one
correct process that has sent an ack message for bothm and
m′. e verification at line 30 of Algorithm 3 prevents a correct
process from sending more than one ack message associated
with some view v. Hence, Lemma 24 holds.
Lemma 25. Suppose that process s has collected a message
certificate form in some installed view v. Moreover, suppose that
s has collected a message certificate form′ in some installed view
v′⊃v. en,m=m′.
Proof. Since s has collected a message certificate for m in v,
at least v.q processes have acknowledged m by sending an
appropriate ack message associated with v to s (line 31 of
Algorithm 3).
In order to prove Lemma 25, it is enough to prove that every
correct process q that is member of a view v′ ⊃ v will send
an ack message associated with v′ form′ only ifm′=m. We
prove this by induction.
Base Step: Suppose that v′ is an installed view which directly
succeeds view v in the sequence of installed views (Lemma 18).
Every correct process q∈v′ receives from at least one process
z ∈ v that z has acknowledgedm in v (line 9 of Algorithm 2
and line 14 of Algorithm 3). Hence, every correct process q∈v′
knows that it is allowed to send an ackmessage associated with
v′ form′ only ifm′=m (line 30 of Algorithm 3). Note that there
might be some auxiliary views ”between” v and v′. However,
outcome is the same: every correct process that is a member of
v′ ”discovers” thatmwas acknowledged in the past and sends
an ack message associated with v′ form′ only ifm′=m.
Induction Step:ere is an installed view v′ such that every
correct process q∈v′ knows that it can send an ack message
associated with v′ form′ only ifm′=m. We should prove that
every correct process r∈v′′, such that v′′ is an installed view
that directly succeeds view v′, will know that it is allowed to
send an ackmessage associated with v′′ form′′ only ifm′′=m.
Process r receives from at least one process in v′ (line 9 of
Algorithm 2 and line 14 of Algorithm 3) that r is allowed to
send an ackmessage associated with v′′ form′′ only ifm′′=m.
us, r ”discovers” that message m has been acknowledged
in some view that precedes v′′.
erefore, every correct process p∈ v′, where view v′⊃ v
is installed, acknowledges a message m′ in v′ if m′ = m.
Consequently, if s collects a message certificate for m′ in v′,
thenm′=m.15
Lemma 26. Suppose that process s has collected a message
certificate form in some installed view v. If s has also collected a
message certificate form′ in some installed view v′, thenm=m′.
Proof. Lemma 26 follows directly from Lemma 24 if v=v′.
If v 6=v′, Lemma 26 is a consequence of Lemma 25.
eorem 7 (Consistency). If some correct participant delivers
a messagem and another correct participant delivers a message
m′, thenm=m′.
Proof. Lemma 22 claims that if message m is delivered by a
correct process, then sender s has collected amessage certificate
for m in some installed view v. Besides that, s has also
collected a message certificate form′ in some installed view v′
(Lemma 22). Lemma 26 states that if s has collected a message
certificate for both m and m′, then m = m′. Consequently,
eorem 7 holds.
Lemma 27. Suppose that a correct participant p has delivered
v.q 〈con-commit,m,v〉messages (line 53 of Algorithm 3), where
v is some installed view. en, every correct process q∈v′, such
that v′⊃v is installed, deliversm.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction.
Base Step:Viewv′ is a viewwhichdirectly succeeds viewv in a
sequence of installed views. Hence, process q∈v′ receives from
at least one process in v that messagemwas delivered, checks
the message certificate and deliversm (line 13 of Algorithm 3).
Induction Step: A view v′ is installed in the system such that
every correct process q ∈ v′ has delivered message m. We
should prove that every correct process r∈v′′, such that v′′ is
a view that directly succeeds view v′ in a sequence of installed
views, will deliverm. Clearly, process r receives from at least
one process in v′ thatmwas delivered and deliversm (line 13
of Algorithm 3).
Hence Lemma 27.
eorem 8 (Validity). If a correct participant s broadcasts a
messagem, then every correct participant q eventually delivers
m or process q leaves the system.
Proof. Lemma 19 claims that there is a view vfinal which
includes every possible change that can be proposed in the
execution. erefore, we should prove that every correct
process q∈vfinal eventually deliversm.
When process s broadcasts m, s includes its view of the
system inside of a prepare message (line 27 of Algorithm 3).
Suppose that the current view of s is v. ere are two possible
scenarios:
1. Process s collects a message certificate form in v (line 37
of Algorithm 3).
2. Process s does not collect a message certificate for m
in v. However, s eventually installs a new view v′ and
rebroadcastsm to processes in v′ (line 20 of Algorithm 3).
Process s collects a message certificate in view v′ or
rebroadcasts the message again to processes in a new
view v′′. Eventually, view v′′ ”becomes” vfinal and then
s collects a message certificate.
Consider a case where swants to leave the system. en,
s will not collect a message certificate for m in vfinal,
because s is not amember of vfinal. However, s eventually
reaches a view v′final in which all reconfiguration requests
are processed, except for 〈−, s〉. And the system can
not reconfigure from v′final (verification at line 25 of
Algorithm 1). Hence, s collects a message certificate for
m in v′final.
e same argument can be made for the commit and
con-commit messages. Hence, when s delivers a Byzantine
quorum of con-commitmessages associatedwith some view v′,
Lemma 27 proves that every correct process that is a member of
an installed view v′′⊃v′ deliversm. is ensures that every cor-
rect process that is a member of vfinal deliversm if v′ 6=vfinal.
In the case when v′=vfinal, reliable links and the fact that
system can not be further reconfigured guarantee that every
correct process that is a member of vfinal delivers m. us,
validity is satisfied.
eorem 9 (Totality). If a correct participant p delivers a
messagem, then every correct participant q eventually delivers
m or process q leaves the system.
Proof. Lemma 19 claims that there is a view vfinal which
includes every possible change that can be proposed in the
execution. erefore, we should prove that every correct
process q∈vfinal eventually deliversm.
When a correct participant p delivers a messagem, p relays
that message to every process that is a member of the current
view of p (lines 24 and 46 of Algorithm 3). Suppose that the
current view of p is v. Lemma 27 claims that if v.q processes that
are members of v deliver messagem, every correct process r
that is amember of any subsequent installed viewwill deliverm.
ere are two possible scenarios:
1. Process p collects v.q con-commit messages for m
(line 53 of Algorithm 3).
2. Process p does not collect v.q con-commit messages.
However, p eventually installs a new view v′ and rebroad-
casts a commit message form to processes in v′ (line 24
of Algorithm 3). Process p collects v′.q con-commit
messages for m in view v′ or rebroadcasts the message
again to processes in a new view v′′. Eventually, v′′
”becomes” vfinal and then p collects an aforementioned
quorum of con-commit messages.
Consider a case where p wants to leave the system.
en, p will not collect a quorum of con-commit
for m in vfinal, because p is not a member of vfinal.
However, p eventually reaches a view v′final in which
all reconfiguration requests are processed, except for
〈−,p〉. And the system can not reconfigure from v′final
(verification at line 25 of Algorithm 1). Hence, p collects
a quorum of con-commit form associated with v′final.16
When p delivers a Byzantine quorum of con-commit
messages associated with some view v′, Lemma 27 proves that
every correct process that is a member of an installed view
v′′⊃v′ deliversm. is ensures that every correct process that
is a member of vfinal deliversm if v′ 6=vfinal.
In the case when v′=vfinal, reliable links and the fact that
system can not be further reconfigured guarantee that every
correct process that is a member of vfinal delivers m. us,
totality is satisfied.
eorem 10 (Non-triviality). A correct process does not send
any messages before invoking a join() operation and after
returning from leave() operation.
Proof. A correct process p starts sending messages once it
invokes a join() operation. Moreover, p halts and stops sending
any messages when p leaves the system.
6 Proof of dbrbOptimality
As we have already stated, our dbrb is, in a precise sense,
optimal. Namely, we prove in this section that even if only one
process in the system can fail, and it can fail by crashing, then
it is impossible to implement a stronger primitive denoted with
Strong Dynamic Byzantine Reliable Broadcast (sdbrb). sdbrb
satisfies the same set of properties as dbrb (definitions 1 and 2),
except that validity and totality properties are exchanged for
strong validity and strong totality, respectively.
First, we define strong validity and strong totality. Second,
we present the model we consider and prove that neither
strong validity nor strong totality can be implemented in an
asynchronous system where processes can leave and one
process can crash (§6.1).
Definition 13 (Strong Validity). If a correct participant s
broadcasts a messagem at time t, then every correct participant
q∈S(t) deliversm.
Definition 14 (Strong Totality). If a correct participant p
delivers a message m at time t, then every correct participant
q∈S(t) deliversm.
Model. We consider an asynchronous system ofN processes
that communicate by exchanging messages. ere are no
bounds on message transmission delays and processing times.
Moreover, at most one process can crash in any execution.
Process that crashes at any point in time is called faulty. A
process that is not faulty is said to be correct. Moreover, reliable
links connect all pairs of processes.
Described model is the same as the model we assume in
dbrb, except the failure model considered is crash-stop (not
arbitrary failure model). From that perspective, this model is
even stronger. Moreover, as we will present in the rest of the
section, we analyze simple executions in which at most two
processes (out ofN) leave the system.
6.1 Impossibility Proofs
Strong Validity impossibility. Let R1 be a run of some
deterministic algorithmA, in which some process p has taken
action a at time t. LetR2 be another run ofA, such that (i) p’s
initial state is the same inR1 andR2, (ii) until time t, process
p observes the same environment (e.g., sequence of messages
delivered) in R1 and R2. It follows that p also takes action a
at time t in runR2.
Suppose that process s crashes at time ts = 0 in run R1.
Moreover, some process p invokes a leave() operation of sdbrb
at time t′>0. Because of the leave liveness of sdbrb, p leaves
the system at time t≥t′.
Consider runR2 in which process s broadcasts a messagem
at time ts=0, but all messages from s are delayed until time t+.
Moreover, process p invokes a leave() operation of sdbrb at
time t′ and until time t observes the exact same environment as
inR1. From p’s perspective, runR2 is indistinguishable from
R1. Hence, p leaves the system at time t and does not deliver
mwhich violates the strong validity of sdbrb.
Strong Totality impossibility. Consider a deterministic,
distributed algorithmA that implements sdbrb (which ensures
properties defined in definitions 1 and 2, except that totality
is exchanged for strong totality). Algorithm A is a set of N
programs, each associated with a single process in the system.
Each such program contains operations of sending a message,
receiving a message and processing information in the local
memory. Recall that, here, we consider a crash-stop failure
model where at most one process can crash.
e activity of each process p is modeled as a sequence of
events. e first event of process p is denoted by e1p, the second
event of process p is denoted by e2p. e i-th event of process
p is denoted by eip.
Event eip can be:
• send(q,m): p sends messagem to process q,
• deliver(q,m): reception of messagem from process q,
• internal event (all other events, e.g., x=5).
Events may modify the state of the process. e state of process
p after the occurrence of ekp is denoted by σkp . e initial state
of p is denoted by σ0p. Here we focus on one specific message
m sdbrb-broadcast in sdbrb system. erefore, the state of
some process p can take two values: (i) ⊥: which means that
p did not sdbrb-deliver message m; or (ii) >: which means
that p sdbrb-delivered message m. Clearly, the following
observations about the state of p hold:
• (σ0p=⊥); and
• (σip=⊥) =⇒ (∀j<i :σjp=⊥); and
• (σip=>) =⇒ (∀j>i :σjp=>).
Definition 15 (Local history of process p). Local history of
process p is defined as the (possibly infinite) sequence of events
of p: hp
def
=e1pe
2
pe
3
p... . e prefix (of length k) of hp is denoted by:
hkp
def
=e1pe
2
p...e
k
p.17
Definition 16 (Condition Set). Consider a local history hp of
some process p such that σkp => and σk−1p =⊥, where k > 0.
Moreover, suppose that t events from the prefix of length k of hp
(hkp) are deliver(q,m) (i.e., reception of some message m from
some process q). We call the subsequence of hkp that includes only
those t events a condition set of p denoted by Cps and |Cps |= t
is the cardinality of condition set Cps . e set of all possible
condition sets of process p is denoted by Cp.
Definition 17 (Required Condition). Consider a condition set
Cps of some process p such that cardinality of C
p
s is equal to
t= |Cps |. We say that Cps is a required condition of p if and
only if ∀Cp′s ∈Cp :(Cp
′
s 6=Cps ) =⇒ (|Cp
′
s |≥t).
Informally, a condition set Cps represents all the messages
some process p has received before sdbrb-delivering some mes-
sagem in an execution ofA. A required conditionCps represents
the messages necessary to be received by p in order for p to
sdbrb-deliver somemessagem. Moreover, a required condition
Cps represents the ”weakest” condition that must be satisfied in
order forp to sdbrb-deliver somemessagem. Hence, we are just
interested in required conditions of some process p. Moreover,
we focus on required conditions when no process leaves the
system (i.e.,N processes participate inA). en, we prove that
if some processes invoke a leave() operation, strong totality can
not be ensured (some might sdbrb-deliver a messagem, some
might not). Let us provide few examples of required conditions
found in some of the well-known (static) broadcast protocols:
• Best-Effort Broadcast (beb) [6]: A required condition for
some process p to beb-deliver some messagem includes
just one messagem received from the sender.
• UniformReliable Broadcast (urb) [6]: A required condition
for some process p to urb-deliver some message m
includes the reception of two messagesm (regardless of
senders; two in a case when just one process can crash).
Definition 18. Consider a message m = 〈t,c〉 sent by some
process in some execution of algorithm A. We say that m is
a protocol message of algorithm A and arguments have the
following meaning:
• t (Type): Type represents a predefined tag ofm.
• c (Content): Content represents the value with whichm is
associated.
Parameter m of events send(q, m) and deliver(q, m)
represents a protocol message.
Processes can leave the sdbrb system. Some process p leaves
the system and halts once p returns from leave() invocation.
When leave() operation is invoked, pmust ”discover” whether
some messagem has been previously sdbrb-delivered by any
process in order to preserve strong totality. We say that, at the
moment of invoking a leave() operation, p starts executing a
distributed algorithmD that should enable p to sdbrb-deliver
some message m in the end of the execution of D if this
message has been sdbrb-delivered by any process. erefore,
our goal is to show that algorithmD can not be implemented
in an asynchronous environment.
We assume that algorithm D is a full-information protocol
[16, 15, 9]. A full-information protocol is a protocol executed
in rounds, where in first round each process sends its local
state (i.e., all protocol messages of algorithm A delivered and
sent). e messages sent by processes in subsequent rounds
consist the local state of processes and events learned in the
previous round of a full-information protocol. Informally, every
process in each round sends everything it has sent, delivered
and observed up to this point in time. Finally, note that leaving
process p can complete an arbitrary, but finite number of
rounds of algorithmD (since p leaves eventually).
Lemma 28. Suppose that process q sdbrb-delivered messagem
at time t and |S(t)|=N (i.e., no process left the system). Moreover,
suppose thatσkq =>andσk−1q =⊥, wherek>0. If processpdeliv-
ers the prefix of length l≥k of local history of q during an execution
ofD, then p sdbrb-deliversm (to preserve strong totality of sdbrb).
Proof. Suppose that (leaving) process p does not sdbrb-deliver
m and leaves the system. Since q sdbrb-deliveredm at time
t (p∈S(t)) and p left the system without sdbrb-deliveringm,
strong totality is violated. Hence, p sdbrb-deliversm.
Lemma 28 proves that if (leaving) process p receives a (prefix
of) local history of process q, where process q sdbrb-delivered
m, then p should also sdbrb-deliver m (to preserve strong
totality). However, we present two runs that prove that if p
sdbrb-delivers messagem only once it delivers q’s local history
(through an execution ofD), then strong totality can be violated.
Consider run R1 in which some process q crashes at time
tq, |S(tq)|=N (i.e., no process left the system) and no process
sdbrb-delivered a message m. Suppose that some process p
invokes a leave() operation at time t′>tq. Process p exchanges
messages with other processes during the execution ofD and
leaves the system at time t>t′ without having sdbrb-delivered
m.
Consider runR2 where some process q sdbrb-delivers some
message m at time tq and |S(tq)| = N . Moreover, q is the
only process that has sdbrb-delivered message m and every
message from q to other processes from time tq is delayed until
time t+. Suppose that process p invokes a leave() operation
at time t′>tq and that p observes the exact same environment
as inR1 until time t. Hence, p leaves the system at time t>t′
without sdbrb-delivering m which breaks strong totality of
sdbrb. Figure 5 illustrates runs R1 and R2 in caseN=5 and
a full-information protocolD consists of three rounds.
So far, we proved that strong totality is not ensured if
(leaving) process p relies solely on receiving a (prefix of) history
of process q (which has sdbrb-deliveredm) to sdbrb-deliver
m. Hence, process p must sdbrb-deliver m once it receives
histories from processes that have sent some protocol messages
which are incorporated inside of required conditions of q.
Let us give an explanation. Consider a best-effort broadcast
(beb) primitive. Suppose that some process q beb-deliveredm18
Figure 5: RunsR1 (above) andR2 (below).
beb-broadcast by s. We showed above that leaving process p
can not wait to deliver local history of q. However, if p delivers
a local history of swith the event specifying thatm is sent to q,
p should beb-deliverm (since q might have beb-deliveredm).
Consider a protocol message m with sender q such that
∀Crs : rc(Crs) =⇒ deliver(q,m)∈Crs . Here, rc(Crs) is logic
predicate which is true if Crs is a required condition of process
r; otherwise, it is false. Hence, leaving process p should
sdbrb-deliver m if it receives during an execution of D that
process q has sent a protocol messagem to r (event send(r,m)
of process q). We can construct two similar runs as above to
show that strong totality can be violated if r=q (messages from
process r can be arbitrarily delayed, so leaving process p does
not ”discover” that r sentm or whether r deliveredm). Hence,
we need to analyze case where processes r and q are different.
We focus on a required condition of some process r. We
suppose that if (leaving) process p receives local state of process
r during an execution ofDwhere it is clear that r did not sdbrb-
deliver some message m, then p also does not sdbrb-deliver
m. Assume that this is not the case. We give a simple runR3
that shows how strong totality can be violated. Consider sdbrb
system where N =5 and processes A, B, C, D and E are in
the system. Every required condition of process E includes a
protocol message of type T sent by processD and processes
A andB want to leave. ey start distributed algorithmsDA
andDB ”concurrently”. Processes send the same messages in19
executions ofDA andDB. Suppose that all processes receive
messages from processesA,B, C andE in every round ofDA
and DB, except for the last round. In the last round, process
A receives a message from D (and D did previously send a
protocol message of type T toE) and sdbrb-deliversm (note
that A is aware that E did not sdbrb-deliver m). Process B
receives messages fromA,B, C andE in the last round and it
does not sdbrb-deliverm. Strong totality is violated (Figure 6).
As we have stated already, we suppose that if (leaving)
process p receives local state of some process r during an
execution of D where it is clear that r did not sdbrb-deliver
some messagem, then p also does not sdbrb-deliverm. It is
easy to develop R4 similar to R3 where all processes receive
messages from processesA,B, C andD in every round ofDA
andDB, except for the last round. In the last round, processA
receives messages fromA,B,C andD and it sdbrb-deliversm.
However, processB receives a message fromE and it does not
sdbrb-deliverm. Again, strong totality is violated (Figure 7).
We proved that strong totality can not be implemented
if there is one specific protocol message in every required
condition of some process r. In a nutshell, the reason is that
two different processes can receive different information in the
end of an execution of protocol D (one execution started by
one process, whereas other started by another; but, they run
”concurrently”). More specifically, the state ofN−1 processes
at the beginning of the i-th round of a full-information protocol
can be the same as at the beginning of the first round (in the
case when one process out of N ”carries” the information of
interest). Hence, two different processes can reach different
conclusions in the end of an execution ofD (since one process
receives the information from the single process who knows
about it, whereas other process does not).
erefore, we analyze a case when required conditions of
some process r include events of delivery of messages of some
type from every permutation of processes that are in the system.
Intuitively, this means that algorithm for sdbrb-delivery of
some message m by r has a condition of a format ”upon
delivering#t1 messages of type T1 and upon delivering#t2
messages of type T2 and …”. Finally, since one process can
crash, values of t1,t2,... can be equal to at mostN−1.
Without loss of generality, let us focus on a condition of
sdbrb-delivery of some messagem by r informally defined by
”upon delivering N −1 messages of type T” (this represents
the ”strongest” condition for sdbrb-delivery of some message;
the proof given below can easily be generalized to cases when
number of delivered messages of type T is less thanN−1). It
is easy to prove that a leaving process pmust sdbrb-deliverm
if it ”discovers” during an execution ofD thatN−2 processes
have sent an appropriate protocol message of type T to r (for
m, which represents a content of the protocol message).
Suppose now that two processes (out of N) want to leave
and that they execute a distributed algorithmD ”concurrently”.
We give a simple run that shows that it is possible to violate
strong totality in this case. us, we prove that it is not possible
to implement a protocol which ensures strong totality in an
asynchronous system.
Consider a runR in which no process has sdbrb-delivered
messagem, no process crashes andN=5. Moreover, processes
p and q invoke a leave() operation. Without loss of generality,
we assume that a full-information protocolD is composed of
F rounds. Suppose that processes p, p1 and p2 sent a protocol
message of type T to r, Dp algorithm is started by p andDq
algorithm is started by q. Suppose that p in every round of
Dp (andDq) receives messages from itself, p1, p2 and q. Also,
suppose that other processes in every round of Dp (and Dq)
receivemessages from all processes except p. Processes send the
same messages in executions ofDp nadDq. Process p finishes
F -th roundofD at time tbydelivering local states from itself, p1,
p2 and q and sdbrb-deliversm. However, q finishesF -th round
ofD at time t′>t by delivering states from all processes except
p and does not sdbrb-deliver m. erefore, this run violates
strong totality of sdbrb (Figure 8 depicts runR with F=3).
In summary:
1. We proved that leaving process p can not wait to receive
a local state of process q that has sdbrb-delivered some
messagem (Figure 5).
2. en, we focused on required conditions of some process r:
(a) If there is one specific protocolmessagewith sender q
included in every required condition of r, we proved
that strong totality can be violated (figs. 6 and 7).
(b) We proved that strong totality can be violated in the
case when the condition of delivery of r has a format
”upon delivering#tmessages of type T ” (Figure 8).
7 RelatedWork & Conclusions
dbrb vs. Static ByzantineReliable Broadcast. We design
dbrb with the goal of having a more general abstraction than
static brb (Byzantine reliable broadcast [5, 18]). A textbook
specification of brb ensures these five properties: (1) Validity: If
a correct process s broadcasts a messagem, then every correct
process eventually deliversm. (2) Totality: If a correct process
p delivers a messagem, then every correct process q eventually
deliversm. (3) No duplication: No correct process delivers more
than one message. (4) Integrity: If some correct process delivers
a message m with sender s and process s is correct, then s
previously broadcastm. (5) Consistency: If some correct process
delivers a message m and another correct process delivers a
messagem′, thenm=m′.
Notice that no duplication, integrity and consistency are
the same for both dbrb and brb. Moreover, if we suppose that
no process joins or leaves the system, then dbrb ensures the
same properties as brb. Validity and totality properties are
similar across the two abstractions, except that dbrb stipulates
that only processes that do not leave the system deliver the
appropriate messages; interestingly, we proved that stronger
properties than these are impossible in our model. Clearly, dbrb20
Figure 6: RunR3.
Figure 7: RunR4.
generalizes the properties of brb to a dynamic environment.
Asynchronous Reconfiguration. e question of whether
reconfiguration of a system can be done without a consensus
(or similar) primitive was answered positively by [1]. Aguilera
et al.[1] presented DynaStore, a protocol which implements
dynamic atomic storage in a completely asynchronous environ-
ment (i.e., without relying on consensus). DynaStore generates
a graph of viewswhich provides away of identifying a sequence
of views in which clients need to execute their r/w operations.
21
Figure 8: RunR.
SmartMerge [17] and SpSn [10] proposed new approaches
for asynchronous reconfiguration, which rely on laice
agreement (SmartMerge) or a speculating snapshot algorithm
(SpSn). eir goal was to reduce the worst case communication
complexity of reconfigurations and operations concurrent
with reconfigurations. Finally, FreeStore [2] is an interesting
alternative that introduced view generator, an abstraction that
captures the agreement demands of reconfiguration protocols.
However, all discussed protocols [1, 17, 10, 2] were used
for shared memory emulation. Moreover, they considered a
crash-stop failure model. In contrast, we address the problem
of a dynamic broadcasting system and assume an arbitrary
(Byzantine) failure model.
Broadcast Applications. Reliable broadcast is one of the
most pervasive primitives in distributed applications [22]. For
instance, broadcast can be used for maintaining caches in
cloud services [11], in a publish subscribe network [8], and
Byzantine fault-tolerant versions of this primitive (e.g., the
dynamic solution we present in this paper, or static solutions
such as [5, 14, 19]) are sufficiently strong for implementing
decentralized online payments, i.e., cryptocurrencies [13].
Conclusion. We have presented in this paper the specifica-
tion of dbrb (dynamic Byzantine reliable broadcast), as well
as an asynchronous algorithm implementing this primitive.
dbrb generalizes traditional Byzantine reliable broadcast which
operates in static environments, to work in a dynamic network.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate an
arbitrary failure model in implementing dynamic systems, in
contrast to previous work that considered a crash-stop failure
model. e main merit of our approach is that we did not rely
on a consensus building blocks, i.e., dbrb can be implemented
completely asynchronously.
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